'== 'L3< The US Departmentof Energy (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), located in z Sm southeastNew Mexico, is a deep geologic repository for the permanentdisposal of 0 transuranicwaste generatedby DOE defense-related activities. SandiaNational Laboratories (SNL), in its role as scientific advisor to the DOE, is responsible for evaluatingthe long-term performance of the WIPP. This risk-based Performance Assessment (PA) is accomplished in partthroughthe use of numerous scientific modeling codes, which rely for some of their inputs on data gatheredduring characterizationof the site. The PA is subject to formal requirementsset forth in federal regulations. In particular,the components of the calculation fall under the configuration managementand software quality assuranceaegis of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) requirements. This paper describes SNL'Simplementation of the NQA requirementsregarding software quality assurance(SQA). The description of the implementationof SQA for a PA calculation addressesnot only the interpretationof the NQA requirements,it also discusses roles, deliverables, and the resources necessary for effective implementation. Finally, examples are given which illustratethe effectiveness of SNL'S SQA program, followed by a detailed discussion of lessons learned.
Introduction
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a deep geologic repository located in southeast New Mexico, which has been licensed for the permanentdisposal of transuranicwaste generatedby US Departmentof Energy (DOE) defense-related activities [ 1] . The scientific advisor to DOE, SandiaNational Laboratories (SNL), is responsible for evaluatingthe long-term (10,000-year) pert?ormanceof the WIPP. This risk-based Performance Assessment (PA) is accomplished in part throughthe use of numerous scientific modeling codes, which rely for some of their inputs on data gathered during characterizationof the site. These calculations depend in large part on computer codes used to simulateprocesses within the repository system, as well as transportand retardationof radionuclides fi-omthe repository through surroundinghydrogeologic formations, and simulation of releases due to possible futurehuman intrusioninto the repository. Probabilistic modeling and analysis codes are also used to characterizeboth the uncertaintyof physical parametersand the unpredictabilityof fiture events. In such a regulatoryenvironment as nuclear-waste disposal, SNL'S work must be held to high standardsof accountability. For SNL, this means thatthe PA codes must comply with rigorous software quality-assurance(SQA) requirements.
The origins of the formal SQA requirementsare given, and the statusof SQA at the time the requirementswere imposed is described. Interpretationof the requirementsand their applicability to WIPP PA is discussed. This is followed by a detailed description of SNL'Simplementation of SQA, including a description of procedures and roles. Examples are cited which demonstratethe effectiveness of our implementation of SQA. Finally, there is a discussion of lessons learned.
Origin of SQA Requirements
In 1992, the Land Withdrawal Act [2] named the US EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) as the regulator for WIPP. As such, EPA became responsible for developing disposal regulations, and for certifying the long-term safety of the repository. In late 1993, federal regulation 40CFR191 [3] set forth the disposal regulations and release limits. In effect, this regulation outlined what needed to be done to demonstrate compliance with the release limits, without specif~ng how to do it. Then, in early 1996, 40CFR194 [4] established criteriafor demonstratingcompliance with 40CFR191, in effect specif~ng how to do so. This latterregulation invoked the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' (ASME) Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) Standards,i.e., ASME NQA-1-1989 edition, NQA-2a-1990 addenda (Part2.7) to ASME NQA-2-1989 edition, and ASME NQA-3-1 989 edition [5] .
The NQA standardswere originally developed by the ASME at the request of the American National StandardsInstitute(ANSI). ASME formed a committee on Nuclear Quality Assurance in 1975, which developed NQA-1 and NQA-2 from the ANS17ASME N45.2 series of standardsand initially issued them in 1979. The NQA standardsdefine QA program requirements for siting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The standardsalso define QA requirementsfor planning and executing tasks during fabrication, construction, modification, repair, maintenance, and testing of the systems, components, and structures'of nuclear facilities. Part 2.7 defines quality assurancerequirementsfor the development, procurement, maintenance, and use of computer codes. The NQA standardis recognized as the de facto standardfor the nuclear industry, largely because it is maintainedby an active organization thatperiodically updates the standardto reflect both state-of-the-art technologies and real world experience. This fact, and the maturityof the standard,led EPA to select it over other standardsthatwere considered.
Applicability of NQA to WIPP
As described above, the NQA standardswere developed for application to nuclear facilities. While WIPP qualifies as a nuclear facility in a certain sense, the PA software clearly has no real-time pefiormance requirements. In a nuclear power plant, there are time-critical issues for soflware, such as restartcapability following a software "crash". Another example is unintendedfimctionality that,by itself or in combination with other unintended functionality, could degrade the entiresystem (possibly with serious consequences). PA codes, on the other hand, do not sharethese concerns. If a code "crashes", the cause is found, and thejob is merely resubmitted. Unintended fi.mctionality,while undesirable, at most results in an incorrect result, which will be discovered in a subsequentreview; there is no real-time safety issue. Using this rationale, we interpretedthe requirementsof Part 2.7 for application to WIPP PA codes. It is importantto note thatour interpretationwas not unilateral-concurrence was obtained horn both the customer (DOE) and the regulator (EPA), who were engaged early in the interpretationprocess.
The majority of the WIPP software thatrequired qualification to Part 2.7 standardswas already eitherpartially or completely writtenbefore promulgation of 40CFR1 94. These codes had undergone various degrees of earlier SQA, but in all cases, the earlier QA did not fulfill Part2.7 requirements(primarily in the areaof documentation). SNL applied Part2.7, Section 10.2, "Software Developed Not Using This Standard",to address this condition. Section 10.2 essentiallypermits the necessary software requirements,testing, and user documentation to be created after most of the development phases have been completed. Furthermore,Section 10.2 requires thatonce Part2.7 is implemented, configuration management and change control per Part2.7 be implemented as well [6] . Evaluation of our earlier SQA activities showed thatit would be more effective to re-do (versus supplement) qualification for previously qualified computer codes, to ensure consistency and to enable uniform application of testingtools and methods.
Establishment of Existing SQA Program
Promulgation of40CFR191 led to development of the SNL Quality Assurance Program Document, Rev. R, 7/31/95, which was the basis for the SNL QA program thatwas in place for the Compliance Certification Application (CCA) submitted to EPA [7] . Prior to thattime, the SNL SQA program was based on good scientific practice ratherthan regulatory requirements. Based on the natureof the software and its intendeduse, a three-level approach for software qualification was developed [8] . The levels were progressive, and were defined as X (eXperimental), C (Candidate), and A (Adjudicated). An X level code was one thatwas still in the developmental stages. At the X level, conceptual models were being implemented for evaluation. Testing was conducted, but not formally documented. The testing was conducted and reviewed by the code developer. At this stage the code team consisted of the code sponsor, responsible for guiding the code through the defined QA process, and the code consultant,who was responsible for the theoretical basis (conceptual models, physics, etc.) of the code. In cases where the software was a utility code, this was the same person.
At the point where the conceptual model(s) representedby a code were determinedto be applicable for WIPP, the code moved to the next level of QA (level C). At this stage the code was a candidate for full quality assurance. A review team (one or more individuals, depending on the complexity of the software being reviewed) was assigned to the code, and a code-qualification package was assembled for review. When the code was determinedto be stable and ready for final qualification, the code and its accompanying documentation (test cases, user's manual, theoreticalmanual) were assembled for consideration as an A level package. Ratherthan following specific criteria,as the codes were of many different types (utility, modeling, etc.), code sponsors and reviewers were given the following guidance -the documentation must be sufficiently complete thata competent expert has assurancethe code resultsare correct.
The review process consisted of providing the reviewers with the code documentation, and then holding an initial review meeting in which the reviewers, code sponsor, code consultant, QA representative,and scribe met to discuss and document any reviewer concerns. After comment resolution was complete, and reviewers were satisfied thatthe code was working as described, the code was raised to level A. The main emphasis of this multi-level approach was the reliance on the reviewers' expertise and technical judgement. This was quite reasonable, since the primary WIPP modeling codes were not amenable to "traditional" model-validation methods; i.e., one cannot hope to validate predictions of performance for a geological system over a 10,000-year period [9] . In comparison to the imposed regulatory NQA requirements,the main featuresthatwere lacking were consistency of documentation and consistency in degree of testing. Also, the SQA process was not universally applied. With respect to providing objective evidence of quality and confidence in the modeling codes to both the regulator and the public, this was not acceptable.
Implementation of New SQA Program
Once NQA Part2.7 was identified as the software quality assurancestandardfor WIPP project participants,SNL began implementation. The standardwas evaluated for applicability to WIPP software, and the existing SQA process was compared to the applicable sections of the standard. The existing SNL softiare procedures needed revision, ailer which SNL WIPP staff needed to be trainedto them. The NQA Part2.7 standardrepresenteda different approach to sofWare quality thanthe multi-level X, C, and A approach. Rather thanthe software moving through successive quality levels, it would henceforth pass through successive life-cycle phases.
Part 2.7 endorses a systematic, life-cycle approach to software development and, althoughit does not require the use of a particularlife cycle, it uses the ANSI/IEEE 1012 model [10] to illustrateits major components. These are:
(a) the requirevzentsphase, in which the functionality, performance, and interface requirementsof the code are defined; (b) the design phase, in which overall input, output, and problem-solution strategyare defined; (c) the implementation phase, in which actual computer code is writtento implement the design; (d) the testingphase, in which plans for testing the operation and technical correctness of the code are developed and executed; and (e) the installation and checkout phase, in which the code is deployed and tested to demonstrateproper operation on the actualproduction system(s), and is released for production use. In addition, Part2.7 addresses an (&! operation and maintenance plia.se, in which corrective, functional, and/or adaptive modifications are implemented, including updating of activities and information documented in previous phases (a-e); and (g) a Yetirementphase, in which use of the software is prevented. These phases arejust an example; they are illustratedin Figure 1 . The number of phases and the relative emphasis placed on each phase of software development depends on the natureand complexity of the software.
After considering the standard,and with DOE approval, SNL adopted the following lifecycle phases for its software:
(a) the requirements phase, in which the fimctionality, acceptance criteria,and test cases for the code are documented; (b) the design phase, in which the theoreticalbasis, embodied mathematicalmodels, control flow, control logic, and data structuresof the code are documented; (c) the implementation phase, in which the source code is produced, the process of executable generationis documented, the user's manual (which contains instructionsthatdescribe the user's interactionswith the soflsvare) is produced, and the tested fi.mctionalityrequirementsare documented; (d) the verification and validation phase, in which test cases are executed and the outputs are evaluated for demonstrationthatthe software produces valid results (for inputs within the range of permittedusage); (e) the installation and dzeckoutpkase, in which the qualified executable is installed on the production computer (and test cases are repeated if the production platform is not the same as the platform on which the software was qualified); (f) the operation and maintenance phase, in which software modifications are approved, documented, and controlled; and (g) the retirement phase, in which the use of the code is discontinued.
Recognizing the importance of independent technical review to our software, as well as the standard's identification of a testing phase, we combined these two activities (testing and independent review) into one phase, called verification and validation. In this context, validation is defined as the demonstration thatsoftware requirementshave been correctly implemented, not thatthe underlying conceptual model has been validated. From Part 2.7, software verification is defined as the process of determiningwhether or not the product of a given phase of the software development cycle filfills the requirementsimposed by the previous phase. Due to the complexity of the simulation software used by SNL to evaluateWIPP, complete removal of bugs is infeasible. It has long been established in the practice of software engineeringthatcomplete removal of bugs by testing, even for relatively simple codes, is impossible flom a practical standpoint [11] .
Implementationof Part2.7 required both the development and approval of procedures compliant with Part2.7, and the documented trainingof staff to those procedures. This process was complicated for at least two reasons. First, a wide range of computer software was involved, ranging from complex, SNL-written analysis codes to vendorprovided utility codes. Second, many of the codes requiring qualification implemented theoretical models whose resultscannot be explicitly proven (e.g. predicting the performance of the deep geological repository for 10,000 years into the fhture). SNL'S SQA approach dealt with the theoretical-model issue by splitting software and model verification and validation. SNL'S SQA process demonstratedthe proper implementation (i.e., coding) of theoreticalmodels in the codes while initially assuming thatthe theoretical models were appropriateand reasonably representativeof the WIPP. Validation of the theoreticalmodels themselves and the appropriatenessof their use in modeling repository behavior was deferred to SNL'Ssubsequent analysis-review process.
SNL developed a Software QA Procedure [12] to implement the requirementsof Part2.7. This procedure includes a software classification matrix, wherein documentation and testing requirementsfor each class of code (ranging from complex, SNL-written analysis codes to vendor-provided utility codes) are explicitly defined. Software verification and validation is implemented in the procedure by requiringdevelopment of documentation for each phase, plus a documented independent review of each phase for compliance with its requirements. Reviewer's responsibilities are delineated in review forms for each phase. In addition to formal SQA procedures, informal practices were agreed upon to promote completeness and use of consistent methods.
The new SQA procedure developed for the CCA incorporated detailed review checklists for each of the life-cycle phases. The procedure also established a role identified as the Software Configuration Management (SCM) Coordinator. The duties of the SCM Coordinator included reviewing all SQA documentation for compliance with the procedure, and ensuringthatconfiguration managementrequirementswere followed. For the CCA, this was a full-time position. The SCM Coordinator had final signature approval on all SQA documentation. The resultingconfiguration management of the codes and associated documentation was very complete, as indicated by the fact that, despite many auditsby DOE, a noncompliance was never issued on activities under the responsibility of the SCM coordinator.
Training software staff to the life-cycle process was accomplished in a number of ways. Group trainingsessions were provided, guidance memos were issued, and two members from the QA staff were assigned as fill-time SQA Consultants. These SQA Consultants were available to answer questions, defend the software process and products during audits, and respond to any software nonconformances. Removing the burden of responding to auditsthus freed analysts and code sponsors to pursue theirprimary tasks.
Prior to acceptance of a software item for use in the CCA, the software item and its associated baseline documentation had to be approved by an independenttechnical review. From NQA Part2.7, supplement 3S-1, documentation had to be reviewed to the standard" ... that a person technically qualified in the subject can review and understand ... the adequacy of the results . . . without recourse to the originator".
The scope of the software-testingprogram implemented by SNL included analyticaland fictional test cases, as required by Part2.7. In addition, automatedanalysis of a code's structure(static testing) and run-time behavior (dynamic testing) was performed, based on good industrypractice. Test teams were formed to address each code having a direct bearing on the WIPP CCA. The test teams consisted of the code sponsor (or author), code-testing staff whose responsibility was to plan and execute a comprehensive set of code tests, and independentreviewers whose responsibility y was to confirm adequate testing and documentation for each code. The way in which SNL organized the test teams was a departurefi-om classical independentsoftware testing, where code developers play no role in the code testingprocess. However, owing to the unique technical natureof the WIPP codes, the only practical way to develop analyticaltest cases was to have the subject-matterexperts (generally the code authors)develop the test cases and, where possible, define corresponding acceptance criteria. The required "independence" of testing was provided by an independentreview of the scope of the testing and of the documented results of the tests.
Effectiveness
The SQA and testing effort for the CCA began in earnestearly in 1995 with the creation of the new SQA procedure, which filly complied with the requirementsof NQA Part2.7. All appropriateWIPP personnel were trainedto this procedure in July of thatyear. Since it was clear that SNL did not have the personnel resources necessary to complete the qualification and testingtasks on time, qualified personnel were identified and contracted through several existing contracting organizations. In all, about 20 persons were added to the existing personnel to forma total team of about 60 persons working on the SQA effort. There were 21 code sponsors, 10 software testers, 19 technical reviewers, 2 SQA Consultants, 15 documentation supportpersons (consisting of both technical writers and word-processing support), and 4 management coordinators. Some individuals performed multiple roles. Each code to be qualified was assigned a team consisting of one code sponsor, one tester, one technical reviewer, one SQA Consultant,and up to four documentation supportpersonnel (typically one or two technical writers, plus wordprocessing support). Weekly statusmeetings were held to track the progress of every deliverable, identify and solve problems, and demonstratethe strong management support for the effort.
Over the six-month period from July 1995 to January1996, a total of 64 codes (comprising about half-a-million source lines of code) were qualified. Of these, there were 15 scientific modeling codes, 19 utility codes, 10 pre-and post-processor codes, 5 subroutinelibraries, and 15 Data Acquisition System (DAS) codes. The resulting documentation set for each qualified code consisted of a Requirements Document (RD), a Verification and Validation Plan (VVP), an ImplementationDocument (ID), a Validation Document (VD), and a Users Manual (uM). Because all of theses codes were "preexisting" codes, thatis, they were developed prior to implementationof Part 2.7, they were exempted fi-omthe requirementfor a Design Document (DD) by Section 10.2 of NQA Part2.7, as previously described. All documentation and test results, including test scripts, input files, and output files, were stored in the Software Configuration Management (SCM) system [6] .
The EPA was involved in our SQA effort through observation of formal DOE audits and less-formal technical interactionsessions. The EPA was especially interestedin the adequacy of the testing for our main scientific modeling codes. They reviewed the test cases and test results, interactedwith our technical reviewers, and even brought contracted technical experts of theirown to review our work. In many cases these interactionsresulted in the addition of new test cases, the modification of existing test cases, and, in a few cases, the modification of the codes. In the end, they approved and accepted all deliverables from the SQA effort. Engaging the regulatorin our processes from the beginning proved to be very beneficial to the success of this effort.
What Worked Best
Several practices thatwe adopted proved to be critical to the success of the SQA effort. One of these was weekly statusmeetings, which were handled in a manner that minimized the impact on the schedules of the code teams (i.e., the code sponsors, testers, technical reviewers, and documentation support staff), but required tremendous time commitments on the part of the management-supportteam. These statusmeetings allowed us to efficiently track the progress of every deliverable, and to identify problems early so thatthey could be addressedbefore they had much impact. The meetings also provided powerfil motivation to the code teams to expeditiously perform the required work, due to the continual presence of management at the meetings.
Another practice thatproved to be invaluable was the involvement of professional documentation-supportpersonnel. Each code had up to four such persons assigned to it. This enabled the code sponsors and the testersto work more efficiently, because they did not need to be concerned with the details of developing professional-level documentation. They merely had to supply the correct information to the documentation-supportstaff, who would then build the documents. This expedited the overall process greatly, and was a major factor in our overall success.
Also, we involved the regulator (EPA) early in the development of our SQA processes. This proved to be very valuable to our overall success. By viewing the regulator as an ally ratherthan an opponent, we were able to modify our processes to better suit their concerns, and in so doing, we improved our deliverableshnd our processes. At the same time, the regulatorswere able to become more familiar with our codes and the testing that was performed on them. This gave everyone assurancethatwe were on the right track, and thatthe level of documentation and testing which we intended to provide in the CCA would indeed be adequate.
Over the period of time thatthis SQA effort was underway, we experienced several audits and surveillancesby our customer, DOE, which were observed by the regulator, EPA. Although these auditswere difficult at the time because of schedule pressures,they proved to be extremely usefid. First, they gave both our customer and our regulatordirect input into what we were doing. It also provided us the opportunity to identify and correct weaknesses in our processes before they were propagated, or included in the CCA. The reviews also improved the overall quality of our deliverables. These formal interactions were also instrumentalin obtaining the strong support of our management and the complete cooperation of our code sponsors. These reviews produced a large number of Corrective Action Reports (CARS), all of which had to be addressed and resolved. This was a painful, but beneficial process!
Lessons Learned
Probably the most importantlesson thatwe learned from this effort is thatit is more efficient and less costly to build quality in, as a routinepart of your daily work, thanto try and add it on at the end. This is difficult to accomplish in a scientific research and development organization because it requires a complete change of the culture,but in a regulatory environment it is absolutely necessary.
Our QA and testing, due to the natureof our codes, relied heavily on the quality of the technical reviews thatwere performed. In some cases, the quality of technical reviews was inadequate,and this was determined early in our process, during audits. Reviewer trainingis essentialto convey what constitutes a thorough review. In qddition, most technical reviewers must be reminded thattheirtask is not to suggest alternativesto the way the work was done, but ratherto evaluate whether the way it was done was adequate for its intendeduse. It is also importantthatthe reviewer have adequate time to perform the review, free of any pressure to produce a predeterminedresult.
The implementationof SQA on a day-to-day basis required a change of culture, as mentioned above. Such a change can only be accomplished with the strong, consistent, and visible support of the management. This support must include the necessary resources to complete the testing and documentation. The development costs of properly tested and documented sof~are are largely incurred at the beginning of the process. The savings thatresult from continuous, ongoing sof~are QA are accrued mainly in the operation and maintenance phase, in which software spends 80°/0of its lifetime. It is imperative thatmanagement recognize, accept, and support this. They must provide the QA staff, the coordinators, the software testers,the technical reviewers, and the documentation support staff. There must also be adequate support for the ongoing trainingof all staff. Also, managementmust allow enough time in schedules for adequate testing and documentation. These lattertasks typically require a level of resources equivalentto, and sometimes greaterthan,thatrequired for the actualdesign and implementationof the software.
Research is by naturea hypothesis-verification, "prototyping" process thatgenerally does not lend itself to long-term pre-planning. Documentation tends not to be the prime focus or interestof the researcher. However, the overall success of a regulated activity depends equally on the technical quality of work and development of comprehensive documentation, i.e., the production of "objective evidence". To succeed at both scientific research and compliance with regulations, an organization must make a complete philosophical and working-level commitment to both. The otherwise high technical quality of scientific research can, on regulatedprojects, be brought into serious question during technical review or litigation processes if documentation is incomplete, appearsto be inconsistent,or is of poor quality. This is increasingly truewhen the theoretical solutions thatsupport project conclusions have no demonstrable method of validation. During the early portion of the WIPP PA SQA effort, SNL staff struggledwith this dichotomy until the two (research and documentation of objective evidence) came into symbiosis. Our eventual success was a result of supportive management, and the recognition and acceptance by SNL staff of the importance of both requirements,which evolved over time.
The practical need for documentation in highly theoretical researchbecame most apparentwhen it came time to execute and document the testing phase. The answer to the question "what should be tested?" lay in the functional requirements,which initially could be found only in the minds of the developers/researchers. The need to link software requirementswith the definition of the testing scope and the definition of acceptance criteriafor test resultsrequired considerable effort (and perhaps some rework) thatcould have been simplified (or re-work avoided) if the objectives of the software-development effort for each code were spelled out in advance of coding, and maintainedas changes were made throughoutthe development effort.
Importantly,sheer volume of documentation is not the solution. Optimal documentation, focused exclusively at fulfilling regulatoryrequirementsand demonstratingtechnical adequacy, is. At the outset of regulated QA work, organizations must carefully identify what documentation is required by procedures, regulations, or other instructions,as opposed to documentation thatis merely recommended or desired. Complete, consistent, reviewed, and controlled documentation must be provided to address SQA documentation requirements. However, other documentation, which does not derive from specific SQA requirements,and thus may not be fully reviewed or maintained, should be minimized. Potential inconsistencies between SQA and non-SQA documentation can underminethe quality of all documentation, both in the eyes of wellintentionedregulatorsas well as intervenerswho are planning litigation. The fallout from this confbsion can be very expensive and difficult to correct after the fact.
Conclusions
The SNL SQA effort for the WIPP CCA proved to be highly successful in thatthe work was accepted and approved by the EPA and, ultimately, the CCA itself was approved [13] . While much effort (and even pain) was involved, we learnedmuch and ended up with a solid SQA program that should serve us well for the future. It is impossible to be successfi.din a regulatory environmentwithout a solid SQA program thatis rigorously followed. 
